Economic Situation in Jordan by Idris, Iffat
   
The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons 
learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an 
introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid 
desk-based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.  
Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other 
Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
DFID, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please 
contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
Helpdesk Report  
Economic Situation in Jordan 
Iffat Idris  
University of Birmingham 
28.11.2016 
Question 
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1. Overview 
Jordan has one of the smallest economies in the Middle East, and its lack of natural resources 
and water scarcity make it heavily dependent on foreign aid and foreign investment. Following 
the global financial crisis of 2008 growth slowed significantly; the deteriorating regional situation 
since 2011 and subsequent mass influx of Syrian refugees has made recovery difficult, though 
marginal increases in growth are predicted in coming years. Growth is also hampered by 
underlying structural issues which need to be addressed, notably unsustainable expenditure on 
subsidies and high levels of public debt. The government is committed to reform and has taken a 
number of steps in this regard, but it is constrained by the need to maintain public support, 
particularly among its traditional Transjordanian (Jordan’s ‘original’ population) support base.   
Looking ahead, Jordan faces significant challenges, particularly in relation to hosting a vast 
Syrian refugee population, and the risks of on-going/heightened regional instability and conflict. 
However, there is also potential for strengthened economic growth, particularly if the requisite 
reforms are implemented. 
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The key points emerging from the literature are as follows:   
 Macroeconomic performance is mixed: Jordan’s annual GDP growth dropped from 8 
percent prior to the 2008 global financial crisis to 2.6 percent in 2011.
1
 It has since 
recovered slightly, and predictions for 2016 range from 2.6 percent to 3.5 percent (ibid 
and World Bank
2
). However, the trade deficit is high at 26.3 percent in 2015 – largely 
because of the reliance on energy and food imports – and expenditure exceeds 
revenues, resulting in a fiscal deficit of 6.6 percent in 2015 (down from 12.7 percent in 
2012).
3
 The debt to GDP ratio has risen alarmingly from 57 percent in 2011 to 90 percent 
in 2015. While foreign currency reserves are high and inflation is stable, the informal 
sector is significant accounting for an estimated 25 percent of GDP (BTI, 2016: 23) and 
unemployment levels are high, particularly among the young.    
 Key sectors and trading partners: The Jordanian economy is dominated by the 
services sector, which accounts for 70 percent of GDP (2010) and 80 percent of 
employment (SNAP, 2014: 4). The main exports are mineral and chemical products, 
manufactured goods and food products, while the main imports are oil, grains, other food 
products and vehicles (SNAP, 2014). Jordan’s main trading partners are MENA 
countries, the EU, US and China. 
 Refugee crisis impact: The influx of over 650,000 Syrian refugees has placed a huge 
burden on Jordan’s infrastructure and public services. However, the Jordanian economy 
has also benefited from Syrian capital, increased expenditure, increased rental income 
and ready availability of cheap labour (SNAP, 2014). The overall economic impact of the 
refugee crisis is debated, but looking ahead, as donor funding diminishes and pressure 
on services and jobs increases, the effects are likely to be negative.  
 Fiscal reforms: King Abdullah is committed to neoliberal economic reform, and this has 
also been a requirement under agreements with the IMF. However, a legacy of providing 
public sector jobs, and generous fuel, food and other subsidies, means that efforts by the 
government to reduce these have aroused strong public opposition. A limited programme 
of reforms has been implemented to date. Nonetheless international institutions such as 
the IMF and World Bank have expressed confidence in the country’s macroeconomic 
policies.   
 Energy and water scarcity: Jordan is dependent on imports for 96 percent of its energy 
(SNAP, 2014: 4). Instability in Egypt disrupted fuel supplies from there, forcing Jordan to 
buy elsewhere at higher prices. However, the government has signed agreements with 
Shell, and Gulf countries for supply of energy, and is actively pursuing energy 
diversification and independence, e.g. through wind and solar power projects and 
nuclear power (IJzerloo, 2016). Jordan is among the world’s five most poor countries in 
terms of water, a problem exacerbated by weak management and, in recent years, the 
refugee crisis. The government has reached an agreement with Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority for supply of water from the Red Sea (Sharp, 2016).    
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 Vision 2025 and sectoral opportunities: The government has articulated a ten-year 
plan to boost GDP growth and reduce public debt. The strategy for this is export-
orientated and cluster based, seeking to expand sectors that are doing well, and develop 
related sectors. Specific sectoral opportunities include for oil shale extraction in the 
energy sector, development of ICT and a knowledge economy, and promotion of 
tourism.  
2. Key economic data 
Macroeconomic performance 
Jordan has a GDP of USD 39 billion, making it among the smallest economies in the Middle East 
(Ijzerloo, 2016: 3). The World Bank categorises Jordan as an upper middle income country. GDP 
per capita in 2015 was USD 4,947.
4
 
Prior to the 2008 global economic crisis, GDP growth in Jordan was impressive, with four 
consecutive years of 8 percent annual growth (ibid: 2). This was driven in part by the return of 
Palestinian Jordanians from Kuwait and their investments in local enterprises (SNAP, 2014), as 
well as by government fiscal reforms. However, the growth rate dropped to 2.6 percent in 2011, 
rose slightly in subsequent years, but fell again in 2015 to 2.4 percent.
5
 The main factors leading 
to the downturn are regional instability, the influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees, heavy 
reliance on foreign aid, water scarcity and expensive energy imports (see below). Predictions for 
the years ahead vary from 2.6 percent in 2016 and 3.1 percent in 2017 (ibid) to 3.5 percent in 
2016 and 3.8 percent in 2017 (World Bank
6
). 
Jordan is poor in natural resources, and therefore reliant on imports of energy and food. This in 
turn means the country maintains significant trade deficits: imports are three times greater than 
exports (SNAP, 2014). The trade deficit reached a high of 34.7 percent in 2013, before dropping 
back to 26.3 percent in 2015 (Ijzerloo, 2016: 4). Expenditure exceeds revenues. Jordan’s fiscal 
deficit reached 12.7 percent of GDP in 2012, but thanks in part to fiscal reforms undertaken as 
part of a USD 2 billion IMF agreement, as well as reduced import spending due to lower oil 
prices, this fell to 6.6 percent in 2015 (Ijzerloo, 2016: 3). However, the debt to GDP ratio has 
been rising. In August 2011 the country’s overall national debt was USD 16.9 billion, equivalent 
to 57 percent of GDP, but this shot up to 90 percent in 2015 as a result of a USD 3.2 billion 
increase in public debt (Sowell, 2016). The recently approved 2016 budget provides for total 
expenses of USD 11.983 billion, total revenues of USD 10.704 billion, and a deficit of USD 1.279 
billion, equivalent to 3 percent of GDP (Sowell, 2016). 
Foreign currency reserves are high – USD 12.1 billion in 2013 rising to USD 16 billion in 
September 2014 (BTI, 2016: 19 and 23). Inflation has remained generally stable, except in the 
immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis due to changing international prices. Global 
price increases affect Jordan badly since it imports almost 90 percent of its food and energy (BTI, 
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2016). Inflation rose again in 2012 following government cuts in fuel subsidies, reaching a high of 
5.5 percent in 2013 (ibid). However it dropped to 2.9 percent in 2014.
7
  
The share of the informal economy is significant: in 2010 it was estimated to account for 44 
percent of total employment and 21 percent of GDP (SNAP, 2014: 4). These figures are since 
believed to have increased, with the informal economy now accounting for around 25 percent of 
GDP (BTI, 2016: 23). This is in large measure due to the influx of Syrian refugees, willing to take 
on low-paid informal sector work. 
Unemployment is officially 13.1 percent (2015)
8
, but in reality this figure is thought to be much 
higher (Schenker, 2015). Youth unemployment is even higher, at 30 percent (ibid). Labour 
market participation is only about 36 percent and falling (ibid).  
Key sectors and trading partners 
The Jordanian economy is dominated by the services sector, which accounts for 70 percent of 
GDP (2010) and 80 percent of employment (SNAP, 2014: 4). Agriculture contributes only 3.6 
percent of GDP and accounts for 2 percent of total employment (ibid). Severe constraints on land 
and water limit agricultural potential; a situation made worse by land fragmentation and absentee 
owners living in cities (IFAD, 2014). 
The main exports are mineral and chemical products, manufactured goods and food products. 
Data for 2014 compiled by the Observatory of Economic Complexity listed top exports as: 
potassic fertilisers (USD 938M), calcium phosphates (USD 553M), packaged medicaments (USD 
431M), clothing (USD 395M), and mixed mineral or chemical fertilisers (USD 394M).
9
 The 
country’s main imports are oil, grains, other food products and vehicles (SNAP, 2014). Data on 
top imports for 2014 listed these as follows: refined petroleum (USD 3.2B), crude petroleum 
(USD 2.13B), cars (USD 1.18B), wheat (USD 577M) and gold (USD 540M) (ibid). Jordan’s main 
trading partners are MENA countries, the EU, US and China. In 2015 the EU was Jordan’s most 
important trading partner, with total trade in goods amounting to EUR 4.4 billion. 
Tourism used to be a significant source of revenue, in particular foreign reserves (IJzerloo, 
2016), but was badly affected by the 2011 Arab Spring and regional turmoil that followed. The 
industry in Jordan recovered in 2012 and contributed to overall economic growth in 2013. Jordan 
benefited from tourists, notably high-spending visitors from the Gulf, who would usually have 
gone to Lebanon and Syria but were no longer able to do so (SNAP, 2014). However, the overall 
effect of regional instability on tourism in Jordan has been negative: in November 2010, 142,000 
tourists visited the country compared to 78,000 in April 2015 (Schenker, 2015). 
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3. Challenges and constraints  
Political constraints 
Jordanian society is divided into Transjordanians or East Bankers, who constitute the ‘original’ 
population of the country, and large numbers of Palestinian refugees and their descendants. The 
latter are now thought to constitute the majority. However, East Bankers form the traditional 
support base for the Hashemite monarchy. The regime was able to retain their support by 
providing them public sector jobs, as well as large subsidies on fuel and food, and allowing East 
Bankers to dominate political and military establishments. Rural Transjordanian citizens have in 
recent years been supplied ‘with basic foodstuffs at prices well below market levels, and (the 
government has) provided health cards, free school meals and winter coats for primary school 
children’ (BTI, 2016: 22). 
This ‘social contract’ has been undermined over the past decade by economic crisis, which has 
forced cutbacks and reforms, e.g. reduced subsidies, limits on public sector recruitment, and 
neoliberal reforms promoting globalisation and the private sector (dominated by Palestinians). 
This has fuelled a sense of insecurity and anger among East Bankers, made worse by the 
perceived corruption among urban political and economic elites, notably the monarchy’s inner 
circle of advisers and business partners, and even in the royal family (Khorma, 2014; Mango, 
2016). Fuel subsidy cuts following the 2012 IMF agreement led to increased energy prices and 
triggered massive public protests. Since 2011 the government has also faced increased 
demands from diverse opposition groups – including both Palestinians and East Bankers, 
particularly young people – for political reform. These had subsided by 2013, largely because of 
the Syrian conflict and fears that King Abdullah’s ouster could lead to similar civil war in Jordan. 
But the potential for widespread opposition persists.  
Concern about such opposition and the need to preserve its traditional East Banker support base 
constrain the government’s ability/willingness to carry out required reforms, and have even led to 
policies undermining the effects of expenditure cuts. Following the 2012 protests, for example, 
the government increased public sector wages and military payments and pensions. Cash 
compensation payments, aimed at the poor, also mitigated the price rises – but added to 
government expenditure. In 2016 the country’s budget set aside USD 2.8 billion, equivalent to 7 
percent of GDP, in subsidies for electricity, water, bread, cooking gas and fodder (Luck, 2016). 
Tax revenue remains low because of an excess of tax exemptions and a high personal income 
tax threshold which means that only 3 percent of the population pays personal income tax 
(EBRD, 2016: 3). In the long run, such policies and the ‘vast provision of public welfare is 
unsustainable given Jordan’s comparatively scare resources’ (BTI, 2016: 22), but their removal is 
risky politically.  
Business environment 
Jordan has a weak and unpredictable business environment: it ranked 113 out of 189 countries 
in the Doing Business ranking for 2015, down from 107 the year before (World Bank PID). The 
country performs relatively well in the areas of cross-border trade, paying taxes and access to 
electricity, but ‘lags significantly in accessing credit, protecting minority investors and resolving 
insolvency’ (EBRD, 2015: 2). Corruption is perceived to be a major problem in both the private 
and public sectors: ‘surveys indicate that it is one of the primary grievances in the country, and 
some observers have suggested that it has worsened at the highest political level in recent years’ 
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(BTI, 2016: 31). Jordan’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) fell from 58 in 2012 to 66 out of 177 countries surveyed (SNAP, 2014: 4). A related 
problem is nepotism.   
Energy and water scarcity 
Jordan has no oil resources, meaning that approximately 96 percent of the country’s energy 
needs are met through the import of oil and gas (SNAP, 2014: 4). In 2014 Jordan spent USD 5.9 
billion, or 18.5 percent of GDP, on energy (Schenker, 2015). The problem is made worse by a 
tradition of fuel subsidies. Efforts by the government to cut these in 2012 triggered massive 
protests; while down, fuel subsidies ‘continue to be a massive drain on public expenditures’. The 
sharp rise in debt to GDP ratio in 2015 stemmed largely from increased accumulation of debt by 
the National Electric Power Company (NEPCO). Multiple disruptions to the natural gas pipeline 
between Egypt and Jordan, as a result of regional instability, forced the government to buy crude 
oil at higher rates on the open market, in turn leading to a budget deficit of USD 3 billion, or 30 
percent of GDP (Schenker, 2015). But again the government is wary of increasing fuel tariffs to 
avoid antagonising protestors (Luck, 2016). It is also putting caps on individuals and companies 
generating their own solar power, so as ‘to force companies to rely on NEPCO to ensure the 
power company receives the needed revenue to cover its debt’ (Luck, 2016). This in turn has the 
negative effect of hindering competitiveness because of high power costs. The country has, 
however, benefited from reduced oil prices in recent years, helping reduce external trade deficits.  
Water scarcity is a major problem in Jordan: per capita the country has one of the lowest levels 
of water resource availability in the world. It is among the world’s five poorest countries in terms 
of water (BTI, 2016: 24). The problem is made worse by poor infrastructure: over 40 percent of 
Jordan’s municipal water is lost through leakage, poor quality equipment or pipes, malfunctioning 
meters, illegal connections, or poor administrative practices. Misuse of water by a number of 
influential Transjordanian families with close ties to the king and government has also caused a 
decline in national water resources (BTI, 2016). The problem has been made worse by the influx 
of Syrian refugees: the Zaatari refugee camp, which hosts only about 15 percent of Syrian 
refugees, consumes over one million litres per day (BTI, 2016: 24).  
Looking ahead, water scarcity is set to increase due to population growth, influx of refugees and 
climate change. Most climate change models agree that by 2030 to 2040, temperatures in 
Jordan will be one to two Celsius degrees warmer, precipitation will be 10-15 mm less and 
droughts will be more pronounced. Groundwater reserves are being rapidly depleted: the US 
Geological Survey estimates that over a third of these will be depleted in the next two decades 
(USGS & Utah State University, 2011). 
Education and employment 
Jordan has relatively high enrolment in higher education – more than 90,000 students register for 
university each year. However, cuts in public sector employment and reluctance by graduates to 
take on jobs they consider ‘beneath them’ mean that 16 percent of graduates are unemployed. In 
2013, 200,000 college graduates applied for just 6,400 civil service jobs (Schenker, 2015). The 
IMF estimated in 2014 that the economy needs to create 400,000 new jobs by 2020 to meet 
demand (ibid).  
Factors contributing to the persistence of high unemployment rates, even in periods of growth, 
include the creation of informal sector rather than formal sector permanent jobs, and a mismatch 
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between skills and demand (IFAD, 2014). A World Bank report (2013: 4) notes that ‘the country’s 
R&D infrastructure is solid and its scientific production relatively high, but these capabilities are 
not linked to the needs of the economy’. Other factors are reluctance on the part of Jordanians to 
take on ‘menial’ jobs as well as the safety nets (e.g. subsidies) provided by the government. The 
latter two in particular mean that, despite high levels of unemployment, there is a sizeable 
migrant worker population, largely Egyptians but also Filipinos, Indonesians and Sri Lankans 
(IFAD, 2014). Migrant workers are primarily engaged in construction, agriculture, domestic work 
and services (SNAP, 2014). [It is these low-paid, often informal sector jobs that have been 
affected by the influx of Syrian refugees, who are often willing to work for very low wages.] 
Despite forecasts of slight increases in GDP growth in coming years, the employment situation is 
unlikely to improve. Moreover, as the Syrian conflict persists, pressure on the Jordanian labour 
market is likely to increase (see below).     
Regional instability and Syrian refugee crisis 
Regional instability and the Syrian conflict, in particular, have had a major impact on Jordan. As 
noted, attacks on pipelines in Egypt have disrupted supply of fuel to Jordan, which the country 
had obtained since 2002 at below market rates in return for political support for President 
Mubarak (Luck, 2016). The attacks forced Jordan to purchase oil at international market prices – 
a big factor in the jump in public debt seen in the years following the Arab Spring. While the 
country’s trade with Syria was limited, the conflict there has disrupted transit routes to regional 
trade partners, impacting some exports (SNAP, 2014). Tourism in the region – including Jordan - 
has fallen dramatically, though there is some indication that Jordan has benefited from visitors 
who would otherwise have gone to Lebanon or Syria.  
However, the biggest effect has been due to the influx of over 650,000 Syrian refugees into 
Jordan. This has placed a huge burden on the country’s infrastructure and public services. One 
estimate put the aggregate cost to the Jordanian economy of the Syrian presence up to the end 
of 2013 at JD
10
 5.8 billion (USD 8.2 billion), compared to benefits of JD 4.1 billion for the same 
period (Wazani, 2014: 12). The benefits include capital brought in by Syrian refugees, increased 
consumer demand benefitting local suppliers, increased house rents bringing more income for 
landlords, and a ready supply of cheap labour for Jordanian businesses and farmers. Studies 
indicate that the impact of Syrian refugees on the labour market has largely been on the informal 
sector – low paid jobs typically taken by migrant workers rather than Jordanians (Stave & 
Hillesund, 2015).  
Looking ahead, donor funding to help Jordan manage the refugee crisis is diminishing, at the 
same time as it appears less and less likely that there will be peace in Syria and Syrians will be 
able to return to their homeland. As the refugee crisis persists, pressure on local services and 
jobs will increase. Tensions between refugees and host communities are already rising (Mercy 
Corps, 2012; Carrion, 2015). Moreover, if the regional security situation deteriorates, Jordan’s 
continued economic stability is likely to become more tenuous (Schenker, 2015). An escalation 
or lengthening of conflicts in Syria and Iraq beyond 2016 would further weigh on exports, tourism, 
investor confidence and foreign direct investment. If additional refugees were to enter the country 
there would be more pressure on fiscal accounts, infrastructure and public services.  
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Dependence on foreign aid and investment 
Jordan’s lack of natural resources mean that, to date, it has been heavily dependent on foreign 
aid. The country’s strategic importance (including as a buffer between Israel and Saudi Arabia), 
the Hashemite monarchy’s pro-west stance and its recognition of Israel have enabled it to secure 
significant external financial and military assistance, largely from the United States. Between 
FY2009 and FY2014 Jordan received USD 4.753 billion in total foreign aid from the US (Sharp, 
2016: 12). An MOU signed between the US and Jordan in early 2015 commits the former to 
providing USD 1 billion annually in total US foreign assistance for three years (FY2015 to 
FY2017) (ibid). Gulf states are a further important source of funding: in December 2011 Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the Emirates committed to providing USD 5 billion over five years (BTI, 
2016: 35). This pronounced dependence on foreign aid poses obvious risks.  
The country is also heavily dependent on foreign investment to fund domestic infrastructure 
projects. In 2015 USD 736 million of the Jordanian government’s USD 1.4 billion capital 
expenditure was to be underwritten by the Gulf (Schenker, 2015). Given falling oil prices, the 
capacity of Gulf countries to sustain such high levels of investment cannot be assumed. 
Nonetheless, at the recent May 2016 World Economic Forum meeting which it hosted, Jordan’s 
resource mobilisation efforts were successful, reportedly securing USD 6.9 billion in investment 
(Schenker, 2015).  
4. Government response 
Fiscal and structural reforms 
King Abdullah has presented himself as in favour of modernising the economy and liberalising it. 
He has carried out a number of ‘neoliberal’ reforms aimed at fostering investment and the private 
sector, curbing the role of the public sector, and achieving fiscal stability (e.g. through subsidy 
cuts). In 2009 he dissolved parliament two years before the end of its term because of its 
opposition to the government’s economic reforms (BTI, 2016), and in a 2013 interview 
characterised opponents of such reforms as ‘dinosaurs’ (Khorma, 2014: 2). In 2012 Jordan 
entered into a USD 2 billion Stand-by Agreement with the IMF, under which the country 
committed to carrying out structural reforms. However, the constraints which the government 
faces – particularly in relation to retaining public support – mean that reforms (in the sense of 
wider economic reform, not just IMF conditionalities) have not been enacted or implemented as 
fully as required. At the end of 2015 a three-year USD 732 million arrangement was agreed with 
the IMF but again, is conditional on a structural reform agenda to stimulate growth (World Bank, 
2016b).  
Key reforms in recent years and limitations include (EBRD, 2015: 2 unless otherwise stated):  
 A new Investment Law was passed in 2014 which empowers the Jordan Investment 
Board to act as a one-stop-shop for foreign and domestic investors: this became 
operational in April 2015 and streamlines permitting and licensing procedures. However, 
bye-laws dealing with the country’s numerous restrictions on foreign direct investment 
have still not been addressed. 
 In September 2014 a public-private partnerships (PPP) law was passed that sets up a 
PPP unit within the Ministry of Finance to design, evaluate, prioritise and implement 
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projects (ibid). A joint World Bank-OECD project to strengthen investment regulations 
and improve investor protection is also underway (ibid). 
 As noted earlier, fuel subsidies have been eliminated, though the move was 
accompanied by a cash transfer scheme to support low income groups, and electricity 
and water subsidies are gradually being reduced. In general the government is moving 
away from subsidies in the form of flat payments to cash assistance for the most needy 
(BTI, 2016).  
 A new income tax law was passed in December 2014, but its revenue impact was 
weakened by the introduction of new tax exemptions, of which there are already too 
many. While applauding tax reform as a step toward increased government revenue and 
a fairer tax system, the IMF ‘regretted lost opportunities’ (BTI, 2016: 20). However, 
successive governments have expanded indirect taxation levels. 
 Amendments to banking laws have been approved expanding the mandate of the Central 
Bank of Jordan to include safeguarding financial stability, in line with international best 
practice, and strengthening corporate governance and managerial accountability. 
 Some progress is being made in enabling better access to credit, for example through 
the country’s first bankruptcy/insolvency law increasing protection for lenders, and 
licensing of a credit bureau to improve information on borrower creditworthiness. 
 A number of large state companies have been privatised, but a number of oligopolies 
remain (BTI, 2016).  
Energy diversification  
Energy diversification is an important component of the government’s economic policy. The 
National Energy Strategy 2007-2020 aims to achieve an energy mix with 10 percent renewable 
energy by 2020. Jordan has adopted laws for renewable energy and policies designed to attract 
investment in the sector. These include a favourable regulatory structure which permits feed-in 
tariff schemes. In December 2014 and January 2015 licenses were given to build nine solar 
power plants in the Ma’an and Mafruq governorates, and wind energy projects are also underway 
(BTI, 2016: 24). The National Energy Strategy also aims to reduce dependence on oil imports. In 
2015 the government signed a contract with Shell for the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
which should meet around 15 percent of the country’s energy needs. Jordan has also recently 
entered into agreements with Algeria and Saudi Arabia for provision of LNG and electricity 
respectively. In addition the government is exploring nuclear power generation: nuclear energy 
should supply half the energy needs of the country in 2025 (Ijzerloo, 2016: 2).     
Water provision  
Water is an expensive resource, but the government is subsidising costs: this is presented as a 
pro-poor measure, though there are issues with targeting (Zawahiri, 2012). Tariff reform is 
difficult because – as with cutting other subsidies – people are unwilling to give up cheap water, 
and the government is wary of inciting protest, particularly from the southern tribes which are its 
traditional support base (Ducharme, 2015). In 2011 the Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
announced projects aimed at limiting agricultural water use. It has since been merged with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, ‘indicating further commitment to handling this problem’ (BTI, 2016: 24).  
In December 2013 the government signed an agreement with Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
for construction of a Red Sea-Dead Sea ‘water conveyor’. Half the water pumped from the Red 
Sea will be channelled to the Dead Sea to counter shrinkage there, while half will go to a 
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desalination plant to be built in Jordan: some of this water will be used in southern Jordan and 
the rest sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel will sell freshwater from the 
Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan (Sharp, 2016). In February 2015 Israel and Jordan signed an 
agreement setting up a joint agency to administer construction of the Red Sea-Dead Sea pipeline 
as well as the desalination plant. 
Vision 2025 
In May 2015 the government unveiled a ten-year economic programme Jordan 2025: A National 
Vision and Strategy. Commonly referred to as Vision 2025, the blueprint aims to revitalise the 
economy by targeting poverty, unemployment and the fiscal deficit and boosting GDP growth. 
Vision 2025 sees Jordan as an economic gateway to regional markets that takes advantage of 
free trade agreements signed with several countries. Under Vision 2025’s targeted scenario, 
GDP growth is to reach 4.9 percent by 2017, 6.9 percent by 2021 and 7.5 percent by 2025; the 
budget deficit is to be reduced to zero by 2025, and the debt to GDP ratio to 47.4 percent.
11
  
 
The plan is to be implemented through three consecutive executive development programmes 
(EDPs), the first of which runs from 2016-2018. To achieve its targets, Vision 2025 is looking to 
pursue an export-oriented economic strategy, primarily by boosting trade with other countries in 
the region, particularly the GCC states. To bolster industrial development, Vision 2025 takes a 
cluster-focused approach that seeks to expand existing industries that are performing well, while 
developing related or supportive clusters complementary to those industries. The following eight 
clusters have been identified as having high potential for development: construction and 
engineering, transport and logistics, tourism and events, health care, life sciences, digital and 
business services, educational services and financial services (ibid). A National Competitiveness 
and Innovation Committee will establish cluster coordination committees to support the 
development of selected sectors; committees will undertake tasks such as coordinating 
networking between clusters and ensuring that emerging clusters receive sufficient guidance 
from various educational institutions. By focusing on specific clusters, Vision 2025 aims to boost 
the share of agriculture, industry and construction in the economy. 
5. Opportunities 
Improving economic outlook 
As noted, economic growth is expected to increase marginally in the next few years – which can 
be considered an achievement in a region marked by conflict and instability. External observers 
have confidence in the prudence of Jordan’s macroeconomic policies (BTI, 2016: 20). The IMF in 
its April 2015 review of the Stand-by Arrangement with Jordan, reported that the kingdom was 
‘persevering in a difficult regional environment’ and that ‘growth is holding up, inflation is low, the 
current account deficit is narrowing, international reserves are at a comfortable level, and the 
banking system is robust’ (Schenker, 2015). The World Bank was similarly optimistic in its spring 
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2015 report Persisting Forward Despite Challenges, noting that the country’s economy ‘is 
expected to steadily continue to gather pace as reforms continue’ (ibid).    
Key to this confidence is continued reform. The IMF stresses the need for continued public sector 
adjustment to put debt firmly on a downward trend. There is also a need to move aggressively on 
structural reforms geared to job creation and labour market reform, as well as improvements in 
the business climate and the quality of public institutions (IMF, 2015). The World Bank (2016a) 
identifies three key areas it recommends the government should focus on: 
 Implement sound economic policies and growth-enhancing reforms to reduce sensitivity 
to external shocks; 
 Create the conditions for increased private investment and improved competitiveness to 
stimulate job-creating growth; 
 Diversify the energy supply in the medium term to address the country’s macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities. 
A further contributory factor in expected improved growth is implementation of the Jordan 
Compact. This is a package of measures agreed with the EU whereby Jordan will benefit from 
improved trade relations in return for allowing more refugees to work in special economic zones 
and in industries that are understaffed by the domestic labour force. The EU has also relaxed its 
Rule of Origin requirements for Jordan for specific product categories for ten years – something 
likely to spur exports to the EU, as well as investment and job creation in Jordan (World Bank, 
2016b). 
Sectoral opportunities 
The literature identifies specific opportunities in a number of sectors. In the energy sector, there 
is considerable scope for oil shale extraction. Jordan is believed to have the world’s sixth largest 
deposits of oil shale, estimated at 40-70 billion tons underlying more than 60 percent of the 
country (Enefit, 2016). Oil shale development could significantly aid Jordan’s energy 
independence strategy. Oil and oil shale are projected to constitute 54-62 percent of Jordan’s 
fuel mix by 2020 (Sabra, 2015). The government has already taken significant steps to exploit 
this resource, but the future size and impact of the oil shale industry in Jordan depends on the 
development of technically and commercially viable extraction schemes, as well as a transparent 
regulatory regime to attract foreign investment and encourage public-private partnerships. Water 
supply schemes will also be needed to ensure that water scarcity is not exacerbated by diversion 
of water for oil shale extraction (Hochberg, 2015).  
The Oxford Business Group describe Jordan’s information and communications technology (ICT) 
sector as one of the most developed and robust in the region: mobile subscribership jumped from 
3.13 million users in 2005 (57 percent penetration) to 11.1 million users (147 percent penetration) 
at the end of 2014.
12
 Government support for the sector is strong. The World Bank highlights its 
potential: ‘ICT based industries such as business process outsourcing and call centres 
are…areas in which Jordan has a comparative advantage owing to the widespread use of 
English and a history of links with foreign investors’ (WB, 2013: 4).  
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Tourism is another sector with potential for growth. Conflict and instability in other countries in 
the region highlight the appeal of Jordan: the kingdom also benefits from its proximity to large 
regional feeder markets, diverse landscapes and climates and major historical and religious 
sites. A number of large tourism and real estate development projects are underway in the 
coastal city of Aqaba and the Dead Sea area. The plan is to develop Aqaba, the Dead Sea and 
Amman for tourism simultaneously so the benefits are mutually reinforcing. Jordan also has 
potential for ‘niche’ tourism, including religious tourism, health tourism and Muslim tourists 
seeking a conservative environment with halal food and segregated facilities for men and women 
(e.g. swimming pools).   
Knowledge economy 
Access to and quality of education in Jordan is the best in the Arab world, and ranked high 
internationally (BTI, 2016). The adult (aged 15 and over) literacy rate was 96 percent in 2011 (98 
percent for males, 94 percent for females) (SNAP, 2014: 10), while youth illiteracy is almost non-
existent. The enrolment rate for tertiary education is about 40 percent (BTI, 2016: 10). The 2011 
UNDP Human Development Report rated Jordan’s university-level teaching and learning 
opportunities as ‘generally strong’ (ibid). Among Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
members, Jordan has the greatest number of researchers. UNESCO has helped the government 
develop a national strategy for science, technology and innovation for 2013-2017. The 
government aims to turn Jordan into a ‘knowledge economy’. The World Bank asserts that, while 
‘Jordan has developed a valuable knowledge economy, further reforms are needed for the sector 
to fulfil its potential, not least in terms of quantity and quality of jobs’ (WB, 2013: 4).  
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